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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
THE LIABILITY OF THE PROPRIETOR OF A BASEBALL PARK
FOR INJURIES TO SPECTATORS STRUCK BY BATTED
OR THROWN BALLS
In the United States the almost unanimous holding of the
cases considering the liability of the proprietor of a baseball
park to a patron injured while seated in the stands by a wayward
ball either batted or thrown into the stands during the course
of a game, is that the plaintiff cannot recover. There appears
in the decisions, however, considerable confusion as to the basis
of the lack of liability on the part of the defendant. In the
somewhat analogous situation where the plaintiff is struck by a
flying puck while attending a hockey game, there is a greater
amount of disagreement among the cases, with the majority
of the few cases, considering the question allowing recovery.
It is the purpose of this note to consider the giounds on which
recovery is either denied or granted.
In any discussion of the liability of the proprietor of a ball
park three questions arise: Was the defendant negligent? Did
the plaintiff assume the risk of being injured by the wayward
baseball? Was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence?
The normal baseball park is constructed so that the diamond
is surrounded on two sides by seats for the patrons to occupy,
the distance between the diamond and the seats varying with
each park. In many ball parks, the sests extend beyond the dia-
mond along the left and right field lifhes, and some parks pro-
vide seats in the outer extremities of left, center and right
fields. Normally the portion of the stands immediately behind
home plate is protected by screening, and in some ball parks
screening is provided for other portions of the park.
1. In the following cases the plaintiff recovered: Shurman v. Fresno
Ice Rink, Inc., 91 Cal. App.2d 469, 205 P.2d 77 (1949); Thurman v. Clune,
51 Cal. App.2d 505, 125 P.2d 59 (1942); Thurman v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal.
App.2d 364, 97 P.2d 999 (1940); Lemoine v. Springfield Hockey Ass., Inc.,
307 Mass. 102, 29 N.E.2d 716 (1940) ; Shanney v. Boston Madison Square
Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E.2d 1 (1936); Tite v. Omaha Coliseum
Corporation, 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943); James v. Rhode Island
Auditorium, Inc., 60 R.I. 405, 199 Atl. 293 (1938). In the following cases
recovery was denied: Modec v. City of Eveliht, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N.W.2d
453 (1947); Hammel v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 156 Misc. 311, 279
N.Y.S. 815 (2nd Dept. 1935); Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 245
App. Div. 137, 231 N.Y.S. 505 (3rd Dept. 1935); Elliot & Elliot V.
Amphitheatre, Limited, 3 West. Week. Rep. 225 (K.B. Man. 1934).
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The most common situation is that in which the injured plain-
tiff is seated in a seat not protected by screening and is struck
by ball from the playing field either batted or thrown into the
stands. The usual ground of negligence alleged is failure to
screen the seats immediately in front of him, although in some
cases it is alleged that there was negligence in failing to warn
the plaintiff that he might be struck by a ball propelled into the
stands.! In this class of cases, the courts are unanimous, with
but one exception, in denying recovery.
In reaching this conclusion, the courts rely on one or more of
three grounds: lack of negligence on the part of the defendant, 3
contributory negligence by the plaintiff,4 or assumption of risk
2. Other grounds of negligence are occasionally alleged. In Hudson v.
Kansas City Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318 (1942) plaintiff
alleged, in addition to the usual grounds, that defendant was negligent
in offering seats for sale without classifying them as protected or un-
protected, in offering reserved seats for sale of both classes creating a
reasonable but false impression that a "reserved seat" was a screened seat,
and in seating the plaintiff, a person of advanced years and impaired
eyesight, in an unscreened seat without informing him that there was no
screen between him and home plate. The court did not consider these
specific allegations separately, but held that plaintiff could not recover,
putting its major emphasis on the risk of injury due to balls driven into the
stand and the alleged negligence in failing to screen the seats in front
of the plaintiff and to warn him of the danger. In Brummerhoff v. St.
Louis National Baseball Club, 149 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App. 1941) the
plaintiff alleged negligence in that "the defendants negligently directed and
permitted their players to bat out said balls when they knew, or by the
exercise of ordinary care should have known, that such balls were likely
to strike and injure the spectators." The court found that there was no
negligence. In Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56
S.E.2d 828 (1949) the plaintiff alleged negligence in the manner in which
the ball players on the field handled the ball. The court held that the
plaintiff assumed the risk of the injury, indicating however that they would
apply the doctrine in the same way in which the Missouri courts do (see
note 29 infra) which means that they are in effect finding that this was
not negligence. In Curtis v. Portland Baseball Club, 130 Ore. 93, 279 Pac.
277 (1929) the plaintiff was occupying a seat flush with the edge of the
screen. He was hit when a foul ball curved around the screen and brought
suit alleging negligence in failing to erect wings on the screen to prevent
this type of accident. The court held that there was no negligence.
3. Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950);
Brummerhoff v. St. Louis National Baseball Club, 149 S.W.2d 382 (Mo.
App. 1941); Paxton v. Buffalo International Baseball Club, Inc., 256
App. Div. 887, 9 N.Y.S.2d 42 (4th Dep't. 1939); Cates v. Cincinnati
Exhibition Co., 215 N.C. 64, 1 S.E.2d 131 (1939); Hull v. Oklahoma City
Baseball Co., 196 Okla. 40, 163 P.2d 982 (1940) ; Curtis v. Portland Baseball
Club, 130 Ore. 93, 279 Pac. 277 (1929).
4. Crane v. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App. 301,
153 S.W. 1076 (1913); Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Centennial, 29
N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1941), Cincinnati Base Ball Club Co. v. Eno, 112
Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925); Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 105
Wash. 219, 181 Pac. 679 (1919).
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by the plaintiff.- In discussing the cases, the purpose is to
analyze these grounds in order to determine their validity as
bases for decision.
Before the plaintiff can hope to recover from the defendant,
he must establish some conduct on the part of the defendant
which can be characterized as negligent, for it is well settled
that the defendant is not an insurer of those who attend the
game., To find negligence, a duty owed by the defendant and a
breach of the duty must be found. This leads to the first in-
quiry: What is the duty that the proprietor of a baseball park
owes to a patron attending the game?
It has been several times stated that the duty of the baseball
park proprietor to the patron is the same as that of any land-
owner to an invitee on the proprietor's land.7 The Restatement
of Torts has declared the duty of the latter to be as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm
caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial con-
dition thereon if, but only if, he (a) knows, or by the
5. Quinn v. Recreation Park Association, 3 Cal.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144
(1935); Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1950) ;
Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828 (1949);
Emhardt v. Perry Stadium, Inc., et al., 113 Ind. App. 197, 46 N.E.2d
704 (1943); Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball and Amusement Co., 16 La.
App. 95, 133 So. 408 (1931); Shaw v. Boston American League Baseball
Co., 325 Mass. 419, 90 N.E.2d 840 (1950); Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball
and Athletic Association, 185 Minn. 507 240 N.W. 903 (1932); Zeitz v.
Cooperstown Baseball Centennial, 29 N..S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Black-
hall v. Capitol District Baseball Association, 154 Misc. 640, 278 N.Y.S.
649 (Albany City Ct. 1935); Hummel v. Columbus Baseball Club, Inc., 71
Ohio App. 321, 49 N .E. 773 (1943); Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club,
62 Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E.2d 837 (1939); Hoke et uz. v. Lykens School
District et al., 69 D & C 422, 60 Dauph. 226 (1948); Williams et al V.
Houston Baseball Ass'n., 154 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Keys
et al. v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941);
Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 105 Wash. 219, 181 Pac. 679 (1919).
6. Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1950);
Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950);
Blackhall v. Albany Baseball & Amusement Co., Inc., 157 Misc. 801, 285
N.Y.S. 695 (Albany County Ct. 1936) ; Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club, 62
Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E.2d 837 (1939); Curtis v. Portland Baseball Club,
130 Ore. 93, 279 Pac. 277 (1929); Hoke et ux. v. Lykens School District
et al., 69 D & C 422, 60 Daugh. 926 (1948); Williams et al. v. Houston
Baseball Club, 154 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
7. Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950);
Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, Inc., 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318
(1942); Hull v. Oklahoma Baseball Co., 196 Okla. 40, 163 P.2d 982 (1940).
See Brown v. San Frincisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1950);
Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club, 62 Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E.2d 837 (1939) ;
Shaw v. Boston American League Baseball Co., 325 Mass. 419, 90 N.E.2d
840 (1950).
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exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition
which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an
unreasonable risk to them, and (b) has no reason to believe
that they will discover the condition or realize the risk in-
volved therein, and (c) invites or permits them to enter or
remain upon the land without exercising reasonable care
(1) to make the condition reasonably safe, or (2) to give a
warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm without
relinquishing any of the services which they are entitled
to receive, if the possessor is a public utility.8
This rule has been put in another way: the proprietor of the
premises must use reasonable care to keep the premises rea-
sonably safe and give warning of latent or concealed perils,
but he is not liable for injury to an invitee resulting from a
danger which was or should have been observed in the exercise
of reasonable care.9 Under either statement of the rule, it
would appear that the defendant baseball park would be under
no duty to protect or warn his patrons of the danger of being
hit by a wayward ball finding its way into the stand. In view
of the common knowledge of the game of baseball throughout
this country, it quite reasonably could be said that the defendant
has reason to believe that the patron will discover the condition
and realize the risk involved, or, that the danger is one which
should be observed by the patron, thus satisfying the duty of
the defendant, however that duty may be stated.
However, the decision in only one case seems to be based on
that express ground without any discussion of assumption of
the risk of contributory negligence.10 In most of the other cases
through the evolution of judicial decision, a crystallization of
the duty of the defendant has developed in terms of screening.
Although the defendant need not screen all of the seats in the
ball park, 1 he must screen some part of the park to accommodate
8. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343 (1939).
9. Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1950).
10. Hull v. Oklahoma City Baseball Co., 196 Okla. 40, 163 P.2d 982
(1940). See Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S.E.2d
828 (1949); Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164
S.W.2d 318 (1942). There the court said that the general rules applicable
to the relationship of a proprietor of land and a business invitee are ap-
plicable to a case where the plaintiff is injured while attending a ball
game in the defendant's park, that the rules governing the land proprietor's
duty to his invitee presuppose that the defendant has no reason to believe
that the invitee will discover the condition or realize the risk involved
but that the plaintiff assumes the risks of the obvious dangers.
11. See cases cited in note 12, 13 and 14 infra.
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at least some of those patrons who wish to sit behind a pro-
tective screen. There is a verbal conflict in the statement of the
rule, some courts insisting that screened seats must be available
for all those who apply for them, 2 and others insisting that
screened seats must be made available for all who could rea-
sonably be expected to apply for them on an ordinary day, 3
while other courts add to either of the above rules the require-
ment that the most dangerous portions of the ball park must be
screened-i.e. that section immediately behind home plate. 4
However, in only four cases has this distinction between the
statement of the .rules become important and in only one did
the court state the rule in terms of screening. 5 There the court
12. Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball and Amusement Co., 16 La. App. 95,
133 So. 408 (1931); Edling v. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition Co 181
Mo. 327, 168 S.W. 908 (1914); Olds v. St. Louis National Baseball Club,
232 Mo. App. 897, 104 S.W.2d 746 (1937); Grimes v. American League
Baseball Co., 78 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App. 1935); Crane v. Kansas City
Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S.W. 1076 (1913). But
see Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Association, 122 Minn.
327, 142 N.W. 706 (1913). The court held that the duty of the proprietor
of a baseball park was something more than screening a portion of the
stands, and left the question to the jury, indicating however that a sign
posted where the patrons could see it warning them of the danger might be
sufficient.
13. Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1950)(expressly rejecting the rule that screened seats must be provided for
all who apply for them); Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club, 27 Cal.
App.2d 733, 81 P.2d 625 (1938) (same); Quinn v. Recreation Park
Association, 3 Cal.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935) (same); Paxton v. Buffalo
International Baseball Club, Inc., 256 App. Div. 887, 9 N.Y.S.2d 42 (4th
Dep't. 1939) (same); Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Associa-
tion, 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932) (same); Keys et al. v. Alamo
City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (same.)
14. Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club, 27 Cal. App.2d 733, 81 P.2d
625 (1938); Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., 215 N.C. 64, 1 S.E.2d
131 (1939); Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Association, 185
Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932).
15. Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Association, 185 Minn.
507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932). Plaintiff attended a ball game on a very
crowded day. As a consequence he could not get a screened seat and was
forced to take a seat in an unscreened portion of some temporary stands
built out into the playing field where he was struck by a batted ball.
The court, after stating the rule in terms of screening and finding that
it had been satisfied, expressly left open the question of whether it was
negligence to build the temporary stands into the playing field, and found
that the plaintiff assumes the risk of the injury. In Paxton v. Buffalo
International Baseball Club, Inc., 256 App. Div. 887, 9 N.Y.S.2d 42
(4th Dep't. 1939) the court in a summary opinion held that it was error
to instruct the jury that they could find the defendant negligent if the
plaintiff had looked for a screened seat and found none available, apparently
on the ground that the defendant is not under a duty to screen sufficient
seats to accommodate all those who apply for them. In Brummerhoff v.
St. Louis National Baseball Club, 149 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App. 1941) the
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said that it was unnecessary to screen sufficient seats to accom-
modate all those applying for them. The duty was satisfied by
supplying a sufficient number of seats to accommodate those
who could reasonably be expected to request them on an ordinary
day. After this duty has been satisfied, there is no additional
duty to warn the patrons of the dangers involved.1- If the de-
fendant has supplied the necessary screening, it would follow
logically that there could be no recovery by the plaintiff for the
defendant, having satisfied his limited duty, would not be negli-
gent, and there would be no basis for finding liability. Even
if this duty were not fulfilled, if it could not be shown that the
plaintiff was sitting in a section which should have been
screened, or that he would have taken a seat in a screened por-
tion if that portion were made available, there could be no
recovery because there would be no factual causation between
the negligence of the defendant and the plaintiff's injury-that
is, even if the duty had been satisfied, the injury would have
happened anyway.
Most of the decided cases could easily have been placed on this
ground, for in practically every case there were facts from which
the courts could have found that the defendant had not breached
plaintiff bought a ticket entitling him to a screened or unscreened seat.
Unable to locate a screened seat, he sat in one unprotected by a screen
where he was hit. The court found that the defendant was not negligent,
without referring to any rule of screening, apparently on the ground
that the defendant need not furnish screened seats for all who apply
for them. In Shaw v. Boston American League Baseball Co., 325 Mass.
419, 90 N.E.2d 840 (1950), the plaintiff was sitting in an unscreened box
seat on a day when the ball park was sold out. The box contained four
permanent chairs and the management had put two temporary chairs
in the aisle which were occupied. In the plaintiff's suit, the only allegation
of negligence was breach of a statutory duty not to block the aisles with
temporary seats. The court found no causal connection between the
plaintiff's injury and the negligence alleged. As to the general liability
of the defendant the court said the plaintiff assumed the risks of all the
hazards inherent in the game, including that of being hit with a foul
ball. The court made no reference to the duty in terms of screening.
16. Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950),
the court held that there was no duty to warn even though the plaintiff
had erroneously taken a seat behind a screen while she held a ticket
entitling her only to an unreserved unscreened seat and when she was
requested by the usher to move she inquired as to the safety of the un-
screened seats. Keys et al. v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941). See Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 349
Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318 (1942), Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club, 62
Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E.2d 837 (1939), Williams et al. v. Houston Baseball
Ass'n., 154 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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this specialized duty and consequently wasn't negligent.17 In the
majority of cases in which this was spelled out in the opinion
there was a finding of fact that part of the premises was
screened, and either an express finding that some protected
seats were available to the plaintiff if he had chosen to sit in
them,"' or no finding that had there been screened seats the
plaintiff would have made use of them,1- and hence even if
there was a finding that the screening was inadequate, the
result was the same as it would have been had adequate screen-
ing been provided. This would appear to be the most expedient
and rational ground on which to place the decisions and would
adequately dispose of the majority of the cases in accordance
with the prevailing view. However, most courts, after stating
this crystallized rule seem to ignore it, and go on to base their
decision on the holding that the plaintiff either "assumed, " °2
"accepted"21 or "incurred"2 2 the risk, or was contributorily
negligent,23 in failing to sit behind a protective screen when the
choice of such a seat was available to him.
The basic theory of the doctrine of assumption of risk includes
three elements: (1) the conduct of the defendant, or the land
or chattels of the defendant must be dangerous, (2) the plaintiff
must have knowledge of the risk, and (3) the plaintiff must
17. Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1950);
Blackball v. Albany Baseball & Amusement Co., Inc., 157 Misc. 801, 285
N.Y.S. 695 (Albany County Ct. 1936). See also cases cited in notes
18 and 19 infra.
18. Quinn v. Recreation Park Association, 3 Cal.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144
(1935); Emhardt v. Perry Stadium, Inc. et a/., 113 Ind. App. 197, 46
N.E.2d 204 (1943); Hummel v. Columbus Baseball Club, Inc., 71 Ohio App.
321, 49 N.E.2d 773 (1943); Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club, 62 Ohio
App. 514, 24 N.E. 837 (1939); Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Centennial
29 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Blackhall v. Capital District Baseball
Association, 154 Misc. 640, 278 N.Y.S. 649 (Albany City Ct. 1935);
Williams et al. v. Houston Baseball Association, 154 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941); Keys et al. v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
19. Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828
(1949); Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co., Inc., 16 La.
App. 95, 133 So. 408 (1931); Shaw v. Boston American League Baseball
Co., 325 Mass. 419, 90 N.E.2d 840 (1950); Adonnino v. Village of lount
Morris, 171 Misc. 383, 12 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Hoke et ux. v.
Lykens School District et al., 69 D & C 422, 60 Daugh 226 (1948).
20. See cases cited in note 5 supra.
21. Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club., 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d
318 (1942).
22. Emhardt v. Perry Stadium Inc., et al., 113 Ind. App. 197, 46 N.E.2d
704 (1943).
23. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
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voluntarily enter into the area of the risk under such circum-
stances that he is not there as a matter of right. If these three
elements are present and the plaintiff is injured by the danger
created by the defendant, the plaintiff is denied recovery because
he assumed the risk.' '24
However, in the application of the doctrine to the baseball
cases it is not always clear what is meant by the courts. By
applying the term in two essentially different types of situations
the courts appear to be using the term to convey two different
ideas: in some cases it seems to mean that where the defendant
has engaged in conduct, which, absent assumption of risk, would
be characterized as negligent there will be no recovery, even
if such conduct was a factual cause of the plaintiff's injury,
because of the plaintiff's voluntary -assumption of the risk.23 In
other cases2 it appears to mean that the defendant's duty is a
limited one, that after that duty has been performed-and con-
sequently the defendant not being negligent-there remains
a hazard to the plaintiff to which it is not unreasonable for the
defendant to expose him, and if injury results from the risk
the defendant will not be liable. In the latest case 7 decided by
the Missouri Supreme Court this latter meaning was clearly
pointed out. There the plaintiff, while occupying a seat un-
protected by a screen, was injured by a ball hit into the stands.
The court, after pointing out the duty of the defendant in
terms of screening, and finding that the duty was satisfied,
proceeded to say that after a reasonable number of screened
seats has been provided
... there remains a hazard that spectators in unscreened
seats may be struck by balls which are fouled or otherwise
driven into the stands. This risk is a necessary and inherent
24. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 893 (1939); PROSSER, TORTS 376 (1st ed.,
1941); COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 657 (Students ed., Throcknorton, 1930).
25. Adonnino v. Village of Mt. Morris, 171 Misc. 383, 12 N.Y.S.2d 658
(Sup. Ct. 1939); Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Association,
185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932); Kavafilan v. Seattle Baseball Club,
105 Wash. 219, 181 Pac. 679 (1919).
26. Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1950);
Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828 (1949);
Blackhall v. Albany Baseball and Amusement Co., Inc., 187 Misc. 801, 285
N.Y.S. 695 (Albany County Ct. 1936); Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball
Centennial, 29 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball
Club, 62 Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E. 837 (1939); Keys et al. v. Alamo City
Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Williams et al. v.
Houston Baseball Ass'n., 154 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
27. Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950).
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part of the game and remains after ordinary care has been
exercised to provide the spectators with seats which are
reasonably safe. It is a risk which is assumed by the
spectators because it remains after due care has been
exercised and is not the result of negligence on the part
of the baseball club... 28
The use of the doctrine of assumption of risk without con-
sidering the plaintiff's negligence has been recognized by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in a case29 involving the liability of
the proprietor of a hockey rink for injuries incurred by being
struck by a puck driven from the rink into the crowd. In
analyzing the baseball cases the court, after pointing out the
"definite trend" toward denying recovery in such cases, said
that the basis of the denial "seems to be predicated on the
principle that the spectator with knowledge of the dangers
incident to the playing of the game assumes the risk of being
injured thereby, and this without regard to any negligence on
the part of the operator."30
It is apparent from reading the Missouri cases on the point
that the view expressed in the Anderson case is the meaning
referred to by them, and that little more is present than another
verbalization of the rule that the defendant is not liable because
there was no negligent conduct causing the injury complained
of on which to base recovery. In fact, in Missouri, the courts
will not use the doctrine in the first sense suggested above-
for once negligence by the defendant has been established and a
factual causation between the negligence and the injury exists,
assumption of risk cannot be used to defeat recovery.3' As stated
in Edling v. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition Co.: "where
one person owes a duty to another, the person for whose protec-
tion the duty exists cannot be held to have assumed the risks
of injury created solely by a negligent breach of such duty...32
28. Id. at 173.
29. Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation et al., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d
90 (1943).
30. Id. at 31, 12 N.W.2d at 95.
31. Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318(1942); Edling v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 181 Mo. 827,
168 S.W. 908 (1914); Olds v. St. Louis National Baseball Club, 232 Mo.
App. 897, 104 S.W.2d 746 (1937); Grimes v. American League Baseball
Co., 78 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App. 1935); Crane v. Kansas City Baseball and
Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S.W. 1076 (1913).
32. 181 Mo. App. 327, 332, 168 S.W. 908, 910 (1914).
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and in Grimes v. American League Baseball Co. that "upon
proof of defendant's negligence, it (assumption of risk) fell out
of the case."' 3 Hence where the plaintiff could show that the
screening was inadequate and either that the plaintiff was sitting
in a portion which should have been screened, and was unable
to obtain a screened seat, or that he would have occupied a
screened seat had it been available but didn't because of the
lack of them, the defendant could not rely on the doctrine of
assumption of risk to defeat liability.
However, in other states, the courts will allow assumption of
risk to defeat recovery even where there are facts from which
there could be a finding of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant had assumption of risk not been present. In Kavafian v.
Seattle Baseball Club, in the original hearing of the case,34 there
was evidence showing that defendant supplied only 60 feet of
screening, that it should have supplied 120 feet, that plaintiff
was injured while occupying a seat which would have been
protected had 120 feet of screening been supplied, but which
was not protected when only 60 feet was furnished; and that
there were screened seats available on the day of the injury
to which the plaintiff was entitled with the ticket he had pur-
chased. The court affirmed the jury finding for the plaintiff,
holding that the questions of negligence, contributory negligence,
and assumption of risk were properly for the jury. On rehear-
ing,," the decision was reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Apparently accepting its original finding of negligence on the
part of the defendant, the court held that the plaintiff either
assumed the risk or was contributorily negligent in sitting in an
unscreened section of the stands when he could have taken a
seat in the screened portion. The court added that whether
plaintiff's conduct was termed assumption of risk or contributory
negligence, the result would be the same.
It is apparent that by applying the doctrine of "assumption
of risk" in two essentially different types of situations, the courts
are using it in two different senses. In the first sense, its applica-
tion adds nothing to awarding or denying recovery to the plain-
tiff, for its use assumes a sufficient ground-lack of negligence-
33. 78 S.W.2d 520, 525 (Mo. App. 1935).
34. 105 Wash. 215, 177 Pac. 776 (1919).
35. 105 Wash. 219, 181 Pac. 679 (1919).
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on which recovery may be denied; in the second sense, its use
would be justified if proper facts were presented, but only in an
exceptional case will sufficient facts be found to call forth its
use-i.e. negligence plus causal relation. It matters not whether
the application of the doctrine is considered as negating the duty
of the defendant,"6 and thus-theoretically at least-denying
recovery because there has been no negligent conduct on the
part of the defendant, though, absent it, negligence would be
found, or as defeating recovery even though the court finds
a duty and the defendants breach thereof,37 because in any case,
before the doctrine can become important in any substantial
sense, there must be facts showing negligence, omitting the
question of assumption of risk. The use of the language of
assumption of risk generally by the courts leads only to confu-
sion of thought in cases which could be decided on the simple
grounds, either (1) the defendant was not negligent, or (2)
even though the defendant was negligent, the injury would
have occurred any way-i.e. no factual causation.38
An essential element of the assumption of risk doctrine is
knowledge by the plaintiff of the risk, and as a result of this
element and the emphasis on assumption of the risk as a means
of denying recovery, the courts have often gone to great lengths
either to find that the plaintiff actually knew of the risks in-
volved in sitting in the unscreened seats or that the risks of
the game were of such common knowledge that the court was
willing to impute the knowledge of them to the plaintiff.3 Other
36. RESTATMIENT, ToRTs § 893, com. a (1939), PRossnR, TonTs 376 (1st
ed. 1941).
37. CooLEY, LAW OF TORTS 657 (Students ed., Throckmorton 1930).
38. See Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1950).
Plaintiff attended a ball game and was injured an hour after the game
began, while occupying an unscreened seat. In affirming a directed verdict
for the defendant the court, after stating the rule that the defendant's
duty was to provide a sufficient number of screened seats to accommodate
those who might reasonably be expected to call for them on an ordinary
day and finding that plaintiff's injury "did not flow from, was not caused
by, any failure of performance by respondent of any duty owed to her, and
did not give rise to a cause of action in her favor against respondent
for damages for such injuries," went to great effort to impute knowledge
of the risk to the plaintiff and find that she voluntarily assumed the risk
of injury, in order to refute the plaintiff's attempt to "take this case out of
the rule upon the theory that she was ignorant of the game of baseball
and attendant risks, hence cannot be said to have knowingly assumed the
risk."
39. In Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1950)
the court imputed to the plaintiff knowledge of the risk in spite of her
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courts seem to be not interested in the knowledge of the plaintiff,
and are satisfied to say that one who attends a baseball game
assumes the risk of being injured by a ball thrown or batted into
the stands, apparently on the ground that rule of law is
"well-established."4 As indicated above, this concern with the
plaintiff's knowledge is completely unnecessary to the decision
in the majority of cases, for if the theory suggested were
adopted, it would be unnecessary to consider the question of as-
claimed ignorance thereof from the facts that she was a mature woman of
46 years of age, that she had seen one baseball game played before although
this game was not played in a ball park but on a large field at which
time she observed the game from an automobile and had not observed balls
fly into the crowd, that she had attended this game for an hour before the
injury "which should have apprised her of the risk of being struck by a
ball," even though she had not been paying attention to the game, but
had been conversing with a friend, that she had seen children playing
in the streets and that the game of baseball was of wide spread knowl-
edge. The court indicated that it wasn't concerned with her actual knowl-
edge of the risks by saying that "we find nothing here to take appellant
outside the usual rule (that patrons at a ball park assume the risk of
injury by a wayward ball), whether it be said that this 'common knowledge'
of these obvious and inherent risks are imputed to her or that they are
obvious risks which should have been observed by her in the exercise of
ordinary care." In Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Ass'n.,
185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932) the court found that the plaintiff
had knowledge of the risks in spite of his claimed ignorance of them,
because he had attended ball games when he was a youth, had seen one
ball game recently, and had witnessed the game at which he was injured
for six innings before the injury. In Keys et al. v. Alamo City Baseball Co.,
150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) the court found knowledge of the
risks from the facts that the plaintiff had attended one ball game previous
to the one in which she was injured, that she attended the ball game with
her son who was a baseball "fan" and had been in the habit of attending
ball games in the past, and that the son had handled baseballs under the
watchful eye of the plaintiff. "This history, coupled with a universal
common knowledge, was bound to have acquainted plaintiff with the
potential dangers inherent in a baseball in play." In Lorino v. New Orleafis
Baseball and Amusement Co., Inc., 16 La. App. 95, 133 So. 408 (1931)
the plaintiff took a seat in the bleachers which was protected by a screen
five feet in height. While he was looking for a seat, he was injured when
a ball travelled over the screen and struck him. The court, however, held
that he assumed the risk, finding his knowledge of the risk from his
familiarity with the game coupled with the common knowledge of the
game of baseball, in spite of his contention that he assumed that a five-
foot screen in front of the bleachers which were 168 feet from the plate
was sufficient to protect him from balls driven into the stand.
40. In Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Company, 80 Ga.App. 572, 56
S.E.2d 828 (1949) the court found that the plaintiff assumed the risk even
though there were no facts indicating that he had knowledge of the risks,
on the ground that "he must be presumed to know that there is a likelihood
of wild balls being thrown and landing in the grandstand and other un-
protected areas." Hummel v. Columbus Baseball Club, Inc., 71 Ohio App.
321, 49 N.E.2d 773 (1943); Hoke et ux. v. Lykens School District et al.
69 D & C 422, 60 Dauph 226 (1948).
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sumption of risk at all; hence the common knowledge of the
game, at least in so far as the question of assumption of risk
is concerned, would be immaterial. However, because the courts
do in fact consider the question of knowledge, it will be dis-
cussed here. There is no question that when the plaintiff actually
knew of the risks involved in the game, this requirement would
be satisfied.41 There would be few cases, it seems, in view of
the common knowledge of the game, where the plaintiff did not
actually know that balls are batted into the stands and that he
might be hit by them. Apparently, with this in mind, the courts
regularly point out the widespread knowledge of the game and
the fact that a person watching the game for any length of
time cannot help but realize the danger of being struck by a
baseball which might cause serious injury.42 In Cineinnati
Baseball Club Co. v. Eno43 the court said that:
it is common knowledge that in baseball games hard balls
are thrown and batted with such great swiftness they are
liable to be thrown or batted outside the lines of the diamond
and spectators occuping positions which may be reached by
such balls assume the risk of injury therefrom.44
And in Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Assn.45
No one of ordinary intelligence could see many innings
of the ordinary league game without coming to a full reali-
41. Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n., 3 Cal.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935);
Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d. 318
(1942); Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club, 62 Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E.2d
837 (1939); Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Centennial, 29 N.Y.S.2d 56
(Sup. Ct. 1941); Blackball v. Albany Baseball and Amusement Co., Inc.,
157 Misc. 801, 285 N.Y.S. 695 (Albany County Ct. 1936); Blackhall v.
Capitol District Baseball Ass'n., 154 Misc. 640, 278 N.Y.S. 649 (Albany
City Ct. 1935); Williams et al. v. Houston Baseball Ass'n., 154 S.W.2d
874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Keys et al. v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150
S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club,
105 Wash. 219, 181 Pac. 679 (1919).
42. See Brown v. San Francisco Baseball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. App.
1950); Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga.App. 572, 56 S.E.2d
828 (1949); Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball and Amusement Co., 16
La.App. 95, 133 So. 408 (1931); Hummel v. Columbus Baseball Club, Inc.,
71 Ohio App. 321, 49 N.E.2d 773 (1943), Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball
Club, 62 Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E.2d 837 (1939); Williams et al. v. Houston
Baseball Ass'n., 154 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Keys et al. v. Alamo
City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). But see Wells
v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Ass'n., 122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W. 706
(1913). (The court expressly rejects the concept that baseball is of such
common knowledge).
43. 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925).
44. Id. at 180, 147 N.E. at 87.
45. 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932).
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
zation that batters cannot, and do not, control the direction
of the ball which they strike and that foul tips or liners
may go in an entirely unexpected direction. He could not
hear the bat strike the ball many times without realizing
that the ball was a hard object. Even the sound of the
contact of the ball with the gloves or mitts of the players
would apprise him of that. It is our opinion that the plain-
tiff, notwithstanding his alleged limited experience, must
be held to have assumed the risk of the hazards to which
he was exposed.46
Because of this common knowledge of the game the courts have
in several cases imputed knowledge of the risks to the plaintiff
in spite of his claimed unfamiliarity with the game.4 7 It appears
that this is stretching the application of assumption of risk
to meet a contingency, for if the plaintiff did not in fact have
knowledge of the risk, the doctrine is not properly applicable,
actual knowledge of the risk being required.4 8 Furthermore,
46. Id. at 509, 240 N.W. at 904.
47. See cases cited in note 39 supra. In the cases involving the liability
of the proprietor of a hockey rink to a person injured by a puck, the
courts do not as readily apply the doctrine of assumption of the risk,
apparently on the ground that the plaintiff did not realize the risk involved.
Where the plaintiff claimed to be ignorant of the game, the courts gave
to the jury the question of whether or not he assumed the risk. Shurman
v. Fresno Ice Rink Inc., 91 Cal.App.2d 469, 205 P.2d 76 (1949); Thurman
v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal.App.2d 364, 97 P.2d 999 (1940); Lemoine v. Spring-
field Hockey Ass'n., Inc., 307 Mass. 102, 29 N.E.2d 716 (1940); Shanney
v. Boston Madison Square Garden, Corp., 296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E.2d 1 (1936) ;
Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943); James
v. Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc., 60 R.I. 405, 199 Atl. 293 (1938).
However, in four cases the courts have denied recovery on the ground the
plaintiff assumed the risk. In two of these cases there was a fact finding
that plaintiff actually was familiar with the game and knew of the risks.
Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N.W.2d 453 (1947); Elliot
& Elliot v. Amphitheatre, Limited, 3 West.Week.Rep. 225 (K.B. Man.
1934). In Hammel v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 156 Misc. 311, 279
N.Y.S. 815 (2d Dep't. 1935) the court in a memorandum decision dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that he assumed the risk by
analogy to the baseball cases. In Ingersol v. Onandaga Hockey Club,
245 App.Div. 137, 281 N.Y.S. 505 (3d Dep't. 1935) the court affirmed the
lower court's granting of a non-suit on the ground that the plaintiff
assumed the risk, saying that the risks were of common knowledge and
assumed by the spectators. Apparently confusing the doctrine of assump-
tion of the risk with the duty of the defendant in the first instance the
court held that it didn't matter that the plaintiff had never seen a game
before or that she did not know of the risks, because it would be unreason-
able to require the defendant to make inquiry of each patron as to whether
or not he had witnessed a game before. Clearly these last two cases
cannot be supported on the ground of assumption of the risk, because
one of the essential elements-realization of the risks by the plaintiff-is
missing.
48. See note 24 supra.
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if the courts are merely finding the knowledge by the plaintiff
from the evidence presented, they are deciding a question which
is usually for the jury.
On the other hand, apart from the duty of the landowners to a
business invitee generally, pointed out above, which the courts
apparently do not follow in establishing the particularized duty
of the proprietor of a baseball park, the common knowledge of
the game is important in considering the defendant's negligence
in the first instance. Undoubtedly the widespread knowledge of
the game plays an important role in the determination of the
duty established for the defendant in terms of screening. Since
liability rests primarily on the unreasonable conduct of the
defendant, the fact that the plaintiff and all those attending
a ball game are treated as being fully aware of the dangers
incident to the game, and enter the ball park generally with the
expectation that balls will be hit into the stands, the conduct
of the defendant in screening only a portion of the stands is
more reasonable than if the patrons had no knowledge of the
risks, for generally the defendant is not the plaintiff's keeper.
The reasons usually assigned for limiting the duty of defendant
are that the danger is not that great ;49 that most patrons do
not want to sit behind a screen ;50 that it would be unreasonable
to expect the defendant to announce the danger in front of the
ball park since most patrons would resent it;"i and that the
defendant has no way of picking out from a crowd the patrons
who do not know of the danger in order to warn them. 2 But
undoubtedly, underlying all these reasons is that fact that
knowledge of the game is widespread and it is up to the plaintiff
to keep his eyes on the ball during the game and dodge when
it is hit towards the stands.5 3
The remaining element of assumption of risk, besides the de-
49. Grimes v. American League Baseball Co., 78 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App.
1935).
50. Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball and Amusement Co., Inc., 16 La.App.
95, 133 So. 408 (1931); Grimes v. American League Baseball Co., 78
S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App. 1935); Keys et al. v. Alamo City Baseball Co.,
150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
51. Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950);
Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., 215 N.C. 64, 1 So.2d 131 (1939); Keys
et al. v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
52. Keys et a. v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941).
53. Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950).
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fendant's "dangerous" conduct, is the plaintiff's voluntary entry
into the area of risk. From the nature of the case, it is apparent
that the area of risk is the unscreened portion of the stands
surrounding the baseball diamond and the plaintiff's taking a
seat in such portion of the stadium is an entry into that area.
The only questionable point is whether his entry into such area
is voluntary, especially where he is ignorant of the seating
arrangement and protected portions provided. It is clear that
where the plaintiff holds a ticket entitling him to a protected
or an unprotected seat at his election, his choosing the latter
type is a voluntary entry.' Clearly also where the plaintiff
buys a ticket and takes a seat in the unscreened stands with
full appreciation of the screening arrangements, the entry of
the plaintiff into the area is voluntary.5 Although it has been
contended to the contrary, 6 where the plaintiff does not have
the choice between an unscreened and screened seat with the
ticket he possesses and holds a ticket for a seat outside the
screening provided (1) because he does not know of the seating
arrangements,'57 or (2) because the seats protected by screens
are more expensive than those not so protected, 8 the action
of the plaintiff in entering the unscreened area of the stands
is a voluntary entry into the area of the risk. The defendant
is not a public utility, and as a consequence the plaintiff does
not have a right that he be allowed to remain on the premises.
The defendant merely offers this form of amusement to the
plaintiff who can view it or not at his own choice, but he cannot
demand it. The only right or privilege which the plaintiff has
is one derived from the defendant's consent.59 Consequently
he cannot claim that his action in accepting the seat to which
his ticket entitles him was not voluntary where he is given his
choice between sitting in the screened seats, or turning his ticket
54. Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 105 Wash. 219, 181 Pac. 679
(1919) ; Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n., 3 Cal.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935).
55. Williams et al. v. Houston Baseball Ass'n., 154 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941); Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal.
App. 1950).
56. Note, 11 Notre Dame Law. 93 (1935).
57. Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Ass'n., 185 Minn. 507,
240 N.W. 903 (1932); Keys et al. v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d
.368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
58. Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball and Amusement Co., 16 La.App. 95,
133 So. 408 (1931); Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club, 62 Ohio App. 514,
24 N.E.2d 837 (1939).
59. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 893, comment b (1939).
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in for a refund and leaving the premises, or if screened seats are
available, exchanging his ticket for a seat in the screened portion
of the stands.60
The final basis on which recovery is denied is that of contri-
butory negligence. At the outset, it should be pointed out that
in practically every case denying recovery on the ground of
contributory negligence, the court did not need to discuss the
question because the ground either that the defendant was not
negligent or that there we no causal relation between defendant's
conduct and the injury was readily available to the court. How-
ever, in some cases courts ignore those grounds and proceed to
consider contributory negligence, just as courts consider assump-
tion of risk after finding no negligence.
Negligence, whether by the defendant and hence the foun-
dation of a cause of action, or by the plaintiff and hence a
defense to a cause of action, is conduct which is unreasonable
under the circumstances, i.e. conduct in which a reasonably
prudent man would not have engaged out of respect for his own
or others' safety. The question then arises: Is the plaintiff's
conduct in viewing the game from an unscreened portion of the
stands unreasonable under the circumstances? To find contri-
butory negligence, the majority of the cases considering the
question look to the plaintiff's action in taking a seat in the
unscreened portion of the stands, when he knows or should
60. Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n., 3 Cal.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935).
The court held that plaintiff's taking a seat in an unscreened portion of
the stands was voluntary when she took the seat temporarily while the
usher was trying to find her a seat in the screened section along the first
base line, where there were screened seats available to her back of home
plate which she did not wish to occupy because she preferred to sit on the
first base side of home plate. Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Centennial,
29 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Plaintiff, who had attended ball games
before and was familiar with the risks, bought seat in an unscreened
section. After noticing several balls being driven into the stands she
decided to move to a safer place. While in the process of moving, she
was hit. Held: She voluntarily assumed the risk. Hunt v. Thomasville
Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828 (1949); Brisson v.
Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Ass'n., 122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W. 706(1913); Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Centennial, 29 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup.
Ct. 1941) ; Adonnino v. Village of Mount Morris, 171 Misc. 383, 12 N.Y.S.2d
658 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Blackhall v. Albany Baseball & Amusement Co.,
Inc., 157 Misc. 801, 285 N.Y.S. 695 (Albany County Ct. 1936); Blackball v.
Capitol District Ass'n., 154 Misc. 640, 278 N.Y.S. 649 (Albany City Ct.
1935); Hummel v. Columbus Baseball Club, Inc., 71 Ohio App. 321, 49
N.E.2d 773 (1943); Hoke et ux. v. Lykens School District et al., 69 D & C
422, 60 Dauph. 226 (1948); Williams et al. v. Houston Baseball Ass'n.,
154 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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know of the risks involved and find that this action amounts to
contributory negligence.'1 In this situation actual knowledge of
the danger is not required, as in assumption of risk; the fact
that the plaintiff should have been aware of the risk is sufficient
if his conduct is unreasonable in the light of that risk.
At least one court, however, was apparently concerned, not
with the plaintiff's occupying a particular seat, but with his
lack of attention to the ball game. In Cincinnati Baseball Club
Co. v. Eno62-one of the few cases allowing recovery-the plain-
tiff was viewing a double header from an unscreened seat in
the grandstand. During the intermission between games a group
of players engaged in a practice session, in the course of which
several balls were in play at the same time. The players did not
confine their activities to the baseball diamond, but were throw-
ing and hitting the balls in various areas of the ball park. The
plaintiff was hit when a player not in the batter's box, but only
15 to 25 feet in front of the grandstand in which the plaintiff
was sitting, fouled a thrown ball into the stands. In affirming
a reversal of the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant,
the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the defendant was not
negligent in failing to satisfy its duty of screening, but held
that it was for the jury to determine whether the defendant
was negligent in allowing the players to engage in practice so
close to the stands. After recognizing the "general rule" that
the plaintiff assumes the risk of being injured by balls batted
or thrown into the stands, the court held that here the questions
of assumption of risk and contributory negligence were for
the jury, distinguishing this case from others on the ground
that this was a practice session between games where, (1) there
were many balls in play; (2) there were several groups of
players on the field using the balls; (3) there was no attempt
to confine the hitting and throwing of the ball to the confines
of the diamond, and (4) the activities of the ball players were
closer to the stand, whereas in those cases where recovery was
denied, the injuries were incurred during a regulation ball game
where there is only one ball in play, only one group of players
61. Crane v. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App.
301, 153 S.W. 1076 (1913); Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Centennial,
29 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 105
Wash. 219, 181 Pac. 679 (1919).
62. 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925).
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using the ball, an attempt to keep the ball within the confines
of the diamond, and the activity takes place at a greater distance
from the stands. Undoubtedly the distinguishing facts in this
case make the question of assumption of risk a closer one and so
for the jury, because, while the plaintiff may realize the risks
involved in the ordinary course of the game and may be held to
have assumed those risks when he enters into the area of the
danger with such realization, it may not be true that the plain-
tiff realizes the greater risk to his safety where the above addi-
tional facts appear. But with respect to contributory negligence,
under the view that it is the plaintiff's action in taking a seat
in the unscreened portion of the stands which is looked to in
order to determine negligence, if the court finds that there is
negligence in sitting there in an ordinary game, certainly it
should find that he was even more negligent in sitting there
with additional factors present. The only plausible explanation
is that the court considered that the contributory negligence
spoken of in the former cases consists of not watching the ball
game while it is in progress, while in this case the plaintiff
could have been paying the utmost attention to the game and
still have been hit because of the unusual circumstances. As
a matter of fact, however, in the cases referred to by the court,
where the play was confined to the diamond, the evidence con-
cerning the plaintiff's attentiveness to the game is not dis-
cussed in finding contributory negligence, the courts referring
only to the conduct of plaintiff in seating himself in an un-
screened portion of the stands. 3
63. Every case, except the Eno case, considering the question has re-jected the distinction between injuries incurred during the regular course
of the game and those incurred during batting practice. Brummerhoff v.
St. Louis National Baseball Club, 149 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App. 1941), (The
facts were substantially the same as in the Eno case except that the batting
practice was taking place while the batter was in the box and not near the
stands. The court distinguished the case on this ground and then decided
that since the batting practice was being held in the normal method, the
defendant was not negligent). Zeitz v. Cooperstown Centennial, 29 N.Y.S.2d
56 (Sup. Ct. 1941), (The plaintiff argued that although she may have
assumed the risks of being injured during a normal game she did not
assume those risks incident to batting practice. The court rejected this
argument, and expressly disapproving of the Eno case, held that the
plaintiff assumes the risks, especially where she is familiar with the game
of baseball, as she was here, of all the normal hazards of the game, of
which being hit by a ball in batting practice was one). Lorino v. New
Orleans Baseball and Amusement Co., 16 La.App. 95, 133 So. 408 (1931),(The court held that plaintiff who had attended many games before and
was familiar with the game, assumed the risks of being injured by a
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In most of the cases in which the courts consider contributory
negligence, they appear to say that if the defendant was negli-
gent in failing to screen the portion of the stands in which the
plaintiff sits, the plaintiff is negligent in sitting there. 4 Obvi-
ously, such a statement can have no content except in the case
where the court has already found that the defendant was negli-
gent. Even though negligence on the part of the defendant and
a factual causal relationship between that negligence and the
injury are found, it still does not necessarily follow that if the
defendant is negligent the plaintiff must also be. As pointed
out above, in general terms, the defendant is required to conform
to the standard of an ordinary prudent man under the circum-
stances for the protection of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is
required to conform to the same standard for his own protection.
It is readily apparent that the circumstances in which the plain-
tiff finds himself are quite different from those in which the de-
wayward ball when he chose an unscreened seat, without considering the
distinction between a batting practice and a normal game). Blackhall v.
Albany Baseball & Amusement Co., Inc., 157 Misc. 801, 285 N.Y.S. 695
(Albany County Ct. 1936), (The court held that the plaintiff assumes the
risk of all normal hazards of the game of which being hit by a batted ball
during batting practice is one). Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80
Ga.App. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828 (1949), (Same. The court expressily dis-
approved of the Eno case saying that pre-game warm-ups are a necessary
incident to the game of baseball and part of the assumed risk). It should
be noted that in none of these cases was there the peculiar allegation of
negligence present as in the Eno case, that the defendant was negligent in
allowing the practice to go on so close to the stands, but only that the
defendant was negligent in improper screening. It would appear that the
screening duty laid down for the defendant would apply also when the
teams were having batting practice, for it would be strange if the defendant
were required to have a different amount of screening for batting practice
than for the regular game, especially because batting practice is a normal
incident to every game. If this were the ground on which the cases were
put, the defendant would not be negligent whether the players were
engaged in batting practice or a regular game, unless by the manner of
holding the practice there was negligence, as in the Eno case. Even then
there would have to be a finding that the player engaged in the practice
was suffciently close to the plaintiff so as to increase the risk to him
or otherwise there would be no factual causation between the negligence
and the injury. After this was found, it might well be true that the
plaintiff did not realize the increased risk to him and hence did not
assume the risk. But, if the courts find that it is negligent to sit in the
unscreened stands during a normal game, it would seem to follow that the
plaintiff would be negligent in sitting there when the risk was increased
and hence he was contributorily negligent. The only case where this would
not be true, would be where there is some exceptional circumstances such
as the plaintiff's unfamiliarity with the game, where it could be said that
the plaintiff did not, and should not have realized the additional risk, or
was not negligent in exposing himself to them.
64. See cases cited in note 61 szfpra.
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fendant stands. The defendant is a baseball proprietor; he is
completely familiar with the game and the hazards incident
thereto; his employees and agents have often observed base-
balls flying into the stands and appreciate the risk of being
hit; indeed, in some cases he has instituted a system whereby
the patron recovering a ball hit into the stand can obtain
a free ticket to another ball game by turning the ball in
to an usher.65 It is because a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances of the defendant would realize the risks
and hazards to the spectators that the defendant is required
to screen a portion of the stands. On the other hand, the
plaintiff is not always as fully apprised as the defendant of
the danger of the game to the spectators. This would especially
be true if he were attending his first game and the injury
occurred while he was looking for his seat. Under these
different circumstances a reasonably prudent man might act
in an entirely different manner. In such a case it could be held
that the defendant was negligent in not screening a portion
of the stands while plaintiff was not negligent in sitting there.00
This distinction is pointed up by the decision of a California
court in Rateliff v. San Diego Baseball Club' -another case al-
lowing recovery. There the plaintiff had purchased a ticket
for a seat behind the screen back of home plate. While she
was walking down an unprotected runway between the grand-
stand and the playing field in order to reach her seat she was
struck by a bat which had slipped out of the hands of a batter
who was taking his turn in the batter's box during batting
practice. There was evidence in the case that bats occasionally
flew from the hands of the batters and that there was no way
to tell in which direction they would go. The court, in affirming
a jury finding for the plaintiff, held that the duty to protect
65. Emhardt v. Perry Stadium, Inc., et al. 113 Ind.App. 197, 46 N.E.2d
704 (1943).
66. In the cases involving the liability of the proprietor of a hockey rink
to a spectator injured by a puck, the courts will sustain a jury finding
of negligence by the defendant and no negligence by the plaintiff, apparently
because of this difference in circumstances-i.e. a reasonable prudent
man may not realize the risk whereas the proprietor should. Lemoine v.
Springfield Hockey Ass'n., Inc., 307 Mass. 102, 29 N.E.2d 716 (1940);
Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E.2d 1(1936) ; Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943);
James v. Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc., 60 R.I. 405, 199 Atl. 293 (1938).
67. 27 Cal.App.2d 733, 81 P.2d 625 (1938).
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spectators from flying bats required the defendant to screen
that portion of the stands where the greatest danger existed
and where such occurrence might be expected. It held that the
jury could properly find that this duty was breached. Although
contributory negligence was not considered in the opinion, it
is apparent that such a decision could not be sustained under
the concept that if the defendant was negligent in failing to
screen the area, the plaintiff was also negligent in entering the
area. The court would be justified in the flying bat situation in
holding that the plaintiff was not negligent while the defendant
was, for in the case of a thrown bat the defendant may be fully
apprised of the risk of its going into the stands because he has
had more opportunity to view such accidents, whereas the
plaintiff was not so fully apprised of the danger.
However, in view of the common knowledge of the game,
factually, in the great majority of the cases, contributory negli-
gence would be a valid ground for denying recovery if it were
needed. This would be true because the primary distinction
between the circumstances of the plaintiff and the defendant
which are to determine the question of negligence of the respec-
tive parties would not in fact be present, for in most cases both
parties are equally apprised of the danger.,, However, in view
of the particularized duty of the defendant the better statement
of the situation would be that because the defendant was not
negligent in failing to screen that portion of the stands, neither
was the plaintiff negligent in sitting there.
In only four cases, in addition to the two already mentioned,
has recovery been allowed, and in five there have been some
unusual circumstances which make the duty of the defendant
to those attending the ball games slightly different, while the
sixth has been greatly limited by a subsequent decision in the
same state. Generally, those cases point up a duty of the de-
68. Undoubtedly situations can be conceived where it would not be
negligent for the plaintiff to expose himself to such a risk, and at the same
time it would be negligence for the defendant to allow it to remain, as for
instance, where the plaintiff, a doctor, was suddenly called to attend a
patient and on his way had to enter an unscreened area which by the
screening rule followed by the court should have been screened. But
because of the limited duty of the defendant, such a situation would be
rare. See Olds v. St. Louis National Baseball Club, 232 Mo.App. 897, 104
S.W.2d 746 (1937).
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fendant other than that of screening those portions of the
stands in which the plaintiff sits.
In Olds v. St. Louis National Baseball Club9 the plaintiff, who
had attended baseball games for 10 years previous to the
accident and was fully aware that balls were often driven into
the stands, had occupied a seat immediately behind home plate
which was protected by a screen. In the ninth inning before the
game was over she started to leave the ball park, and proceeded
to use the closest exit to her seat. This exit, as well as the
only other one which was provided on the same level near her
seat, was not protected by a screen. She was momentarily held
up by the other spectators crowding around the exit, and while
standing there was hit by a foul ball. The court held that the
question of the defendant's negligence in failing to provide a
reasonably safe exit for those who sat in screened seats was for
the jury in view of the fact that the defendant had actual
knowledge that many spectators left the games early; and on
the second appeal" it was held that the defendant, in providing
a method of leaving which was wholly protected by screens which
involved walking up through the stands to the second tier, and
down a ramp in the back of the stands did not, as a matter of
law, satisfy the duty where the exit which the plaintiff took
was the closest one to her seat, and the one which the de-
fendant's ushers would have directed her to take had she in-
quired: The case was a Missouri decision and hence the question
of assumption of risk did not arise once the court found there
was negligence. The question of contributory negligence is more
difficult to decide. The court held that it was for the jury to
determine whether it was negligent for the plaintiff to enter
that area, fully knowing of the risks in view of the facts that
she was a housewife and had to prepare an early supper for her
husband and that many other patrons followed the same practice.
But if there is a finding that the defendant was negligent in
failing to screen that area, it is hard to see that the relatively
unimportant circumstance that the plaintiff had to fix her
husband's supper would change the conditions under which she
acted enough to make her not negligent in leaving at that mo-
ment and not waiting until there was no batter in the box. On
69. 232 Mo.App. 897, 104 S.W.2d 746 (1937).
70. 119 S.W.2d 1000 (Mo.App. 1938).
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the other hand, and this seems the best explanation for the
case, she may have done this, but was held up by the crowd
surrounding the exit; so that she acted in a reasonably prudent
manner in trying to get safely out of the ball park, but was
held up by a circumstance which she was not negligent in failing
to anticipate.
In Edling v. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition Co.,71 the
plaintiff occupied a seat behind a screen which had rotted away
in places. A foul tip passed through the screen and hit the plain-
tiff, and the court allowed recovery. The court first found that
the defendant knew or should have known of the defect in the
screen while the plaintiff did not, and held that the questions of
contributory negligence and negligence were for the jury. Un-
doubtedly there was sufficient evidence of negligence in not
providing a screen which would stop the balls, for, if the de-
fendant is required to screen a portion of the stands the screen
must be adequate to stop balls driven against it. The question
of contributory negligence is not difficult to dispose of, for it is
quite possibly true that the plaintiff neither knew nor should
have known of the defect.
In Grimes v. American League Baseball Co.72 the plaintiff
who was occupying an unscreened seat was hit when a foul
ball glanced off some temporary stands placed on the field for
the purpose of accommodating the expected customers at the
forthcoming world series. The ball was not hit towards the
plaintiff, but was going by her when it glanced off the stands
and was deflected so as to hit her. The plaintiff realized that
balls were hit into the stands but she did not realize and need
not have realized this particular risk. The court allowed a
verdict for the plaintiff to stand. Again, the question of assump-
tion of risk did not arise as a defense because the court sustained
a jury finding of negligence in constructing the temporary stands
on the playing field. The defense of contributory negligence
was not pleaded and the court did not consider it, but it would
appear that it was not a necessary bar to recovery because the
plaintiff due to the difference in the circumstances may not
have been fully aware of the risk, nor was she necessarily negli-
gent in not discovering the danger.
71. 181 Mo. 327, 168 S.W. 908 (1914).
72. 78 S.W.2d 520 (Mo.App. 1935).
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Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic AssnY' is the only
case found where the plaintiff, sitting outside of the screened
area was allowed to recover for injuries sustained when a foul
ball driven into the stands hit her. The court found that the
duty of the defendant was something more than just screening
those seats for those who may wish them on a particular day,
and allowed the jury to determine just what that duty was,
indicating, however, that a sign apprising the spectators of the
danger would be enough if placed in the proper position. The
plaintiff in this case did not know of the danger of being hit
by the balls, and the court expressly rejected the idea that the
dangers were so well known that everyone was held to know
them; hence assumption of risk could not be used to defeat
recovery. The question of contributory negligence was not dis-
cussed, but apparently it would have been no defense because
it would be reasonable for a party in plaintiff's circumstances
not to know of the danger.
This case has been limited by the subsequent decision of
Brison v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Association 4 where
the court held that the plaintiff assumed the risk of being hit
by a ball driven into the stands, in spite of his claimed failure
to realize the hazard. The court, without expressly overruling
the previous case, said that the risks were of such common
knowledge that they would impute knowledge of them to the
plaintiff, especially in view of the fact that he had been sitting
through six innings of the game before he was injured.
In conclusion, it should be noted that although the courts have
said that the duty of the baseball park proprietor to the spectator
is the same as that of any landowner to a business invitee, in
fact the duty is not the same. In the case of an ordinary land-
owner, the proprietor is not required to take action if he has
reason to believe that the invitee will discover the danger, while
the baseball park proprietor is bound to screen a portion of the
stands in spite of the fact that the overwhelming number of
spectators who attend a ball game realize that balls are hit in
the stands and appreciate that injury could result thereby. In
view of the slight expense involved in maintaining a screen in
relation to the total size of the enterprise-an enterprise engaged
73. 122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W. 706 (1913).
74. 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932).
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in for profit-it is entirely reasonable to impose such an addi-
tional obligation upon the defendant especially when we consider
the great popularity of the game of baseball and the fact that
many spectators who attend ball games desire screened seats.
But it is not unreasonable to limit his duty to screening a
portion of the stands because of the great popularity of the game
and because many of the spectators who attend the game go with
the express idea in mind of recovering a ball if they possibly
can, as evidenced by the mad scrambles after a ball once it has
been propelled into the stands. 73 Because the duty of the de-
fendant is limited, however, there would rarely be a recovery
where a spectator is injured by a wayward ball finding its way
into the stands. The simplest and most expedient ground on
which to deny recovery would be that the defendant is simply
not negligent, but the cases fail to support this suggestion and
the courts make an entirely unnecessary effort in trying to base
the conclusion on either assumption of risk or contributory
negligence. Although either doctrine would be a valid ground
75. In the cases considering the liability of the proprietor of a hockey
rink for injuries sustained when struck by a puck driven off the ice, the
courts have not formulated a crystallized duty as in the baseball cases.
However, due primarily to the fact that the game is not so well known
as the game of baseball and because the activity takes place so much closer
to patrons, the duty in terms of screening is somewhat greater than
the duty of baseball park proprietors. Protecting a portion of the stands
by screens is not enough. Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp.,
296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E.2d 1 (1936), (Jury finding of negligence was allowed
to stand where the rink was surrounded by a wooden fence three feet
high, and a screen was constructed at each end of the rink six feet higher
than the fence and 109 feet in width, where the sides were not protected by
screens). James v. Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc., 60 R.I. 405 199 Atl. 293
(1938), (Same. The construction of the rink was the same as in Shanney
case, but the dimensions of wooden fence and a screening were slightly
different). Thurman v. Clune, 51 Cal.App.2d 505, 125 P.2d 59 (1942)
(same); Lemoine v. Springfield Hockey Ass'n., Inc., 307 Mass. 102,
29 N.E.2d 716 (1940), (same); Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb.
22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943), (same); Shurman v. Fresno Ice Rink, Inc., 91
Cal.App.2d 469, 205 P.2d 77 (1949), (Defendant, in addition to constructing
the rink with a forty-inch wooden wall around it and a higher protective
screen at each end, posted signs to the effect that there was a danger to
the patrons of being hit by a puck driven into the stands, that the patrons
assumed the risk thereof, and that screened seats were available, and made
two announcements to the same effect over the public address system during
the game! Held: Whether the duty is satisfied is for the jury). See
Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N.W.2d 453 (1947), (Plaintiff
assumed the risk); Hammel v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 156 Misc.
311, 279 N.Y.S. 815 (2d Dep't. 1935), (same); Ingersoll v. Onondaga
Hockey Club, 245 App.Div. 137, 281 N.Y.S. 505 (3d Dep't. 1935), (same);
Elliott & Elloitt v. Amphitheatre Limited, 3 West.Week.Rep. 225 (K.B.
Man. 1934), (same).
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on which to decide the cases if the proper facts appeared, in the
vast majority of the cases the doctrines are out of place. It
is submitted that for sake of clarity of thought a breach of duty
on the part of the defendant plus a factual causation between
the negligence and the injury be found by the court before either
doctrine is considered.
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